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Genesis and Substance in Posidonius’
Stoicism
Eduardo Murtinho Braga Boechat
ABSTRACT
The article analyses the metaphysical theory proposed in two fragments of
Posidonius preserved in the doxography of Arius Dydimus, f. 20 and f. 27 Diels
(= F 92 and F 96 E – K). The result of the research is the following. Posidonius
reoriented Stoic ontology by rejecting the two orthodox Chrysippean genera (or
‘categories’), the material substrate (οὐσία) and the peculiarly qualified individual
(ἰδίως ποιὸς or ποιότης). He subsumes both genera under the heading ‘substance’
(οὐσία) which now applies to the predominant qualities that define a body
during all the times at which it exists, and classifies as ‘qualities’ (ποιόν) or
‘matter’ (ὕλη) its remaining, or non-essential, material features. The analysis of
the fragment on Generation and Destruction (F 96 E – K) alongside relevant
Posidonian fragments (F 14 and F 84/97a E−K) also reveals that substance is
analogous to soul in the case of animals. The substantial soul underlies the
qualities of the body that are liable to suffer alteration.
KEYWORDS
Stoic Metaphysics; Posidonius; Generation and Destruction; Cosmogony. 
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1 THE NON-ORTHODOX CONCEPT
he Posidonian fragment regarding the
process of genesis as described by Arius
Dydimus (Epitome fr. 27 Diels) turns up
twice in Stobaeus’ Eclogae. The passage
occurs in a section (I. 20) entitled On
Generation and Destruction which is
mostly concerned with whether the
cosmos is destructible. It is followed by
a reference to criticism of Mnesarchus,
the pupil of Panaeitus. The fragment
recurs in Stobaeus at the end of I. 17;
this is the chapter which contains Chrysippus’ orthodox
classification of mixtures as juxtaposition, fusion and blending
(παραθέσει, συγχύσει, κρᾶσιν). As we shall see, there is substantial
evidence that Posidonius revised the Stoic position and proposed a
new concept of genesis.
From Posidonius: Posidonius says that there are four kinds of
destruction and generation that occur from what is to what is.
For he rejects as unreal any destruction from or generation
into what is not, as we said before. Of change into what is, he
distinguishes: dismemberment (κατὰ διαίρεσιν); alteration (κατ’
ἀλλοίωσιν); fusion (κατὰ σύγχυσιν); breaking up of a whole,
called dissolution (κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν). Of these four, alteration is
related to substance; the other three have reference to
qualities supervening on substance. And it is along these lines
that processes of generation come about. Substance does not
admit of increase or diminution by addition or subtraction,
but only of alteration (τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε
μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι),
as it happens with number and measure (καθάπερ έπ' αριθμών
καί μέτρων συμβαίνειν). So, increase and diminution occurs in
peculiarly qualified individuals, like Dion and Theon,
therefore the predominant quality of each thing persists from
generation to destruction (διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου
ποιότητα [τὰ] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως), as in the
case of animals, plants and things like that that admits
destruction. In peculiarly qualified individuals (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως
ποιῶν), he says that there are two receptive parts, in respect to
5
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the subsistence of the being (κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν)
and of the qualified thing (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ). It is the latter,
as we have often kept saying, that admits of increase and
diminution. This same peculiarly qualified thing (τό τε ποιὸν
ἰδίως) is not the same as the substance from which it is made
(ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο). Nor on the other hand is it different from it,
but is all but the same, in that it is a part of the substance (διὰ
τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας) and occupies the same place as it,
whereas whatever is called different from something must be
separated from it (κεχωρίσθαι) and not be thought of
(θεωρεῖσθαι) as even part of it. (Arius Dydimus fg. 27 Diels =
F 96 E   ̶K) 
Let us first have a look at the status quaestionis. In fact, the
two most authoritative commentaries1 g ive d i f fe r en t
interpretations of this passage.2 In his methodical work,3 Kidd
subdivides the fragment into two sections; Description (up to ‘...
And it is along these lines that processes of generation come
about’) and Explanation. Analysing the first section, he considers
the four types of change – dismemberment, alteration, fusion, and
dissolution – having related Stoic classifications as background
(Chrysippus’ and the one mentioned in Philo, De Aet. Mund. 78
ff). Kidd does not assign any conceptual innovation to the doxa,
but cautiously points out that alteration (or transmutation) of
substance (ἀλλοίωσις) was a key term for Posidonius, for the
philosopher distinguished this kind of change from the others.
Accordingly, the second part of the text was supposed to explain
the ἀλλοίωσις – change in the sense that it somehow sets substance
(οὐσία) apart from peculiarly qualified individuals (ἰδίως ποιὸν).
However, Kidd maintains that there is no effective difference
between both: ‘Since I do not see how ἀλλοίωσις can apply to
οὐσία simpliciter but to the peculiar qualified οὐσία of an ἰδίως
ποιὸν, which is what anyway Posidonius seem to be saying here, I
do not think that there is an opposition of οὐσία and ἰδίως ποιὸν.’4
Contrastingly, Long and Sedley’s analysis does not regard
th e ἀλλοίωσις – change as the key term of the passage. They
propose that Posidonius’ doxa basically reproduces the Stoic
concept of the first and second genera (the so-called Stoic
6
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Categories): the metaphysical distinction presumably elaborated by
Chrysippus to answer the sceptical Academy’s Growing Argument.
In Stoic ontology, the first genus, substance (or material substrate),
does not remain identical yet it is incessantly changing; it is the
second genus, the peculiarly qualified individual that remains
unalterable. So, the sentence ‘substance does not admit of increase
or diminution ... but only of alteration’ would reaffirm the Stoic
idea that any change of a 'substance', i.e. a material substrate, can
constitute a change of identity. On the other hand, what does
endure, and constitutes a proper subject of growth, is the
'peculiarly qualified' individual, e.g. Theon, whose uniquely
identifying characteristics must for this purpose be lifelong (cf. διὸ
καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα [τὰ] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς
ἀναιρέσεως). 
Both commentaries are insightful, and I am going to
basically offer a conciliation of the diaphonia. Yet before
submitting my interpretation, I would like to call attention to two
features of the abstract which, as far as I know, have been
overlooked so far. The first one regards what we could call the
metaphysical aspect of genesis. The text seems to be the first Stoic
doctrine addressing the metaphysical question of genesis as it
explicitly mentions the canon nihil fit ex nihilo (... τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ
τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς <τὰ> οὐκ ὄντα). It is not only the fact that
Arius does not introduce any other Stoic in this section (fr. 27). As
scholars have already remarked,5 there is no evidence that the
Early Stoa were similarly wary of the Eleatic veto against genesis
out of not-being. Further, the metaphysical doxa sounds as a
reference to the very beginning of Aristotle’s De Generatione et
Corruptione. The book correspondingly begins by asking whether
there is a distinction between generation and alteration;6 the key
terms in Posidonius’ doxa. So, when we remind that the study of
Aristotle had a significant impact on Posidonius7 the suspicion is
that he attempted to increment Stoic philosophy by addressing the
metaphysical question of genesis in the context of a Aristotelian
heritage.8
Another apparently overlooked feature regards the
7
Calíope: Presença Clássica | 2018.2. Ano XXXV. Número 36 (separata 7)
complementary physical aspect of genesis. One should consider
that the process of blending (krasis) is missing in the doxa. This is
unexpected in the sense that what we know about the process of
cosmogony and zoogony in the Early Stoa specifically refers to the
mixture of elements as a case of blending.9 Blending is, in fact, the
quintessential Stoic idea about mixture as it is directly connected
with the physical concept of pneuma. It is through blending that
the pneuma sustains matter. As one reads in Chrysippus’ excerpt in
Alexander’s De Mixione, the soul blends with the body while
preserving its own substance in the mixture with it (‘As clear
evidence of this being so they make use of the fact that the soul,
which has its own individual existence just like the body which
receives it, pervades the whole of the body while preserving its
own substance in the mixture with it.’ cf. 217. 3610 = LS 48 C 10).
The absence of krasis in Posidonius’ abstract, therefore, suggests a
conflict with the orthodox notion of physical genesis.
These features may work as a starting point for reviewing F
96 E  ̶ K. So, if one begins by considering the ontological content
of Arius’ abstract, one should realise that it does not reproduce
Chrysippus’ concept of the first and second genera, as Long and
Sedley argue (1987, p. 173). The fragment undeniably echoes the
gist of the Growing Argument as formulated in Plutarch’s
invective (On common conceptions 1083a-1084a = LS 28 A) and
in the related material (cf. LS 28). One similarly finds Dion and
Theon, increase and diminution, and the body considered
according to two different categories in F 96 E – K. However,
Posidonius’ idea of two ‘receptive members’ does not match
Chrysippus’ first and second genera. Chrysippus seems to conceive
two analogous yet quasi-independent substrates (‘But these men
alone have seen this combination, this duplicity, this ambiguity,
that each of us is two substrates’ LS 28 A 4) – if not bodies (‘two
bodies sharing the same colour’ LS 28 A 3). Contrastingly,
Posidonius conceives a clear relationship of dependence (or
priority) between two aspects of the body. The peculiarly qualified
individual is said to be both made out of (cf. ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο) and
part of substance (cf. διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας).11
8
Genesis and Substance in Posidonius’ Stoicism | Eduardo Boechat
Regarding the absence of blending in the opening section
of the text, one should bear in mind that it is actually consistent
with Posidonius’ physical doctrines. As I have recently shown, he
partially adopted the Peripatetic theory of elements by conceiving
active and passive elements as interactive due to a new relationship
of mutual contrariety (fire and air are hot; water and earth are
cold).12 Accordingly, the theoretical shift logically requires a new
concept of mixture. Whereas in the Early Stoa the mixture
between pneumatic (fire and air) and material elements entails the
notion of ‘body goes through body’, i.e. blending (krasis), the
adoption of active and passive elements bearing mutually
contrasting qualities should conversely require the Peripatetic
notion of ‘a quality meets a quality’ (GC II 7).13 The blending–
process, therefore, is not expected to take part in Posidonius’
‘Generation and Destruction’. 
As we see, Posidonius’ entry about ‘Generation and
Destruction’ in Arius (f. 27) most likely represents an innovation
within Stoicism. On the one hand, the metaphysical concept of
genesis solves the puzzle of the Academic Growing Argument by
proposing an original ontology at variance with Chrysippus’
solution. On the other hand, the list of kinds of change witnesses
that he abandoned the physical notion of genesis as the outcome
of blending. One could further point out the circumstances that
led Posidonius to departure from the orthodox position. Indeed,
the doxa seems to be another facet of Posidonius’ far reaching
Aristotelianism14 as the adoption of a Peripatetic theory of
elements (F 93 E  ̶ K) corroborates the apparent allusion to
Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione. Still, one should
additionally consider that both the concept of the first and second
genera and also the blending–process were under constant attack.
More specifically, both standpoints were equally criticised for
virtually conceiving two entities occupying the same space (cf.
Themistius On Aristotle's Physics 104, 9-19 ‘For one body will
pass through another body through and through, and two bodies
will occupy the same place’ [LS 48 F]). So, Posidonius’ ‘Generation
and Destruction’ was most likely devised to meet the challenge on
9
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both flanks; metaphysical and physical genesis. It would not be the
only time that Posidonius reoriented Stoic thought following
sceptical invectives.15
2 SUBSTANCE IN POSIDONIUS (F 92 E – K)
So, if Posidonius’ doxa in Arius does not match the views
of the early Stoics, what are its actual conceptual innovations?
What does his concept of genesis stand for? Before submitting my
interpretation, I should say some words about Arius’ collection
and my method of tackling the text. In fact, despite its significance
for Stoic and Posidonian studies, Arius’ testimonies, a rare sort of
discursive doxography, are not easily grasped by scholars.16 His
description of the theories can be sometimes too concise and the
indirect discourse which make regular use of accusative-cum-
infinitive constructions present further complications for the
interpreters. Accordingly, as I reckon, the most reliable method of
making sense of Posidonius’ fragments in Arius consists in relating
it to his other fragments here; it is reasonable to expect a
conceptual coherence within the same corpus. Further, taking
Arius’ collection as starting-point, one can enlarge and deepen the
picture of Posidonius’ physical concepts by bringing into focus the
relevant excerpts from the larger compilation of Posidonius’
attested fragments (i.e. the Edelstein-Kidd collection). I try and
follow this interpretative guidance in this article. 
It is also important to realise that the abstract, as
mentioned above, deals with both aspects of genesis: physical and
metaphysical. Indeed, one could say that whereas Kidd has more
to say about the physical aspect of genesis that is basically limited
to the first half of the text, Long and Sedley focus on the
ontological aspect that occupies the second half. So, in order to
grasp the whole theoretical content of the fragment, one should
start by tackling its ontological message. There is clearly more
information about the notion of genesis and identity in the text
than about the notion of mixture which precedes genesis. As we
shall see, the interpretation of the innovative process of mixture
10
Genesis and Substance in Posidonius’ Stoicism | Eduardo Boechat
apud Posidonius will require a certain amount of reconstruction.17
So, what metaphysical concept does the fragment convey?
Again, it is not the first and second genera as theorised by
Chrysippus. Both Chrysippus and Posidonius conceive an
ontological dichotomy between substance and the peculiarly
qualified individual. However, as mentioned above, whereas the
former considers two quasi-independent substrates, the latter
regards a relationship of dependence between two aspects of the
body (i.e. whole and part). Accordingly, the cornerstone of
Posidonius’ concept of genesis, the gist of the abstract,18 consists
in the relationship between substance and alteration. One reads
‘alteration is related to substance’ and also ‘substance does not
increase or diminish ... but only of alteration’. Specifically, these
sentences contradict the supposition that Chrysippus’ material
substrate (the first genus) represents Posidonius’  ‘substance’.
Whereas the first genus does not remain identical as it relentlessly
comes to be and passes away,19 a straightforward reading of these
sentences suggests that substance only admits alteration, or
genesis, following the ἀλλοίωσςις–change.20 Moreover, Arius’
abstract does not express that Posidonius’ ‘substance’ is always in
flux and in motion – an idea that Plutarch recurrently ascribes to
Chrysippus’ material substrate.21
Now, Posidonius’ dichotomy might be clarified as we bring
into focus another fragment in Arius that similarly conveys an
ontological distinction. It is another compressed account featuring
gnomic language that generated debate between scholars, yet
recent research has managed to make sense of it without recourse
to emendations.22 This is Arius’ Epitome fr. 20.
Ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ
ἄμορφον εἶναι καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα
οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ’ αὑτήν· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι.
Διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν
ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον.
Posidonius claimed that the substance of the wholes is both
unqualified matter and also formless insofar as in no way has
it a shape detached of its own, nor quality by itself either. Yet
11
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it is always in some shape and quality; and the substance,
which is according to its subsistence, differs from matter in
thought only. (F 92 E – K) 
The passage as a whole has a three-part structure as the
indirect discourse entails three infinitive clauses. The first two
clauses are closely connected since the second one could be easily
rendered as an adversative clause. The third colon sounds as a
gnomic utterance yet it is, of course, concluding the whole passage.
Regarding its context, it is important to note that the excerpt
occurs immediately after the doctrines of Zeno and Chrysippus
concerning ousia (i.e. substance or being): Ζήνωνος, ούσίαν δe εἶναι
την τών όντων πάντων πρωτην ὕλην ... Accordingly, despite the fact
that Stobaeus (1. 132, 27-133, 11) intertwined Arius’ text with
Aetius’ doxography ‘on matter’, the Posidonian entry also purports
to define ‘substance’ (Ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν
...). I now offer an interpretation that basically summarizes the
insights of White (2007) and Alesse (2007).
If one starts the analysis from the beginning, one realises
that καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον should read as the nominal
predicate of the subject τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν (with adverbial kai
probably meaning etiam).23 White’s translation: ‘the substance of
the wholes is also unqualified and formless matter ...’ The
statement thus reiterates the standard formulation of Stoic
materialism as it, following the tradition of Zeno and Chrysippus,
equates substance with matter (cf. above Arius fr. 20 = SVF I 87).
Posidonius seems to be saying: the being of the wholes (i.e. of
bodies, or what exists) is simply material (ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ
ἄμορφον). Yet, the following dependent clause specifies the
conditions according to which the plain identification would apply:
‘insofar as in no way has it a shape detached of its own, nor quality
by itself either.’ Accordingly, the overtly hypothetical, or
theoretical, circumstance clarifies the aspectual viewpoint of the
identification: the first sentence purports to introduce one of the
two aspects of ‘substance’ (ousia): the passive principle (cf. D. L. 7.
134 = F 5 E–K: τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν
ὕλην ... εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμόρφους).24 The whole sentence in this
12
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sense should mean: the being of the bodies is also the passive,
material principle.
The following sentence corroborates this interpretation
since it adds a caveat. ‘Yet it is always in some shape and quality’.
Such statement promptly reminds that the plain identification of
substance and matter is purely theoretical. No material substance is
ever entirely devoid of qualities; the passive principle is always
permeated by the active principle which imbues every individual
with qualities and shape. At last, the concluding sentence
noticeably sounds as conveying the passage’s main idea: Διαφέρειν
δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης ... That is, the gist of the fragment is that
although the principles always coexist (ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ
ποιότητι εἶναι), one can somehow distinguish them; and the subtle
ontological contrast between substance and matter, active and
passive principles, features in this last clause. 
The gnomic language of this aphorismatic statement
induced scholars to add emendations to the manuscript reading;
however, as White pointed out,25 the problematic phrase falls
neatly in line with the Stoic theory provided one understands the
meaning of ‘subsistence’ (ὑπόστασις) and ‘in thought’ (ἐπινοίᾳ).
Subsistence stands for the ontological status of the so-called
incorporeals, the class of objects grasped through intellection by
reason (cf. i.a. Sextus Empiricus M 1. 17). Contrasting to bodies
that independently exist (i.e. they act and are acted upon),
incorporeals subsist as their existence is derivative from bodies,
that is, they are abstractions from bodily entities.26 Further, the
concept of subsisting connects, on the one side, incorporeals items
with, on the other side, a person’s cognition or ‘rational
impression’ (cf. S. E. M 8. 70: ‘They [the Stoics] say that a 'sayable'
is what subsists in accordance with a rational impression’).
Incorporeals do not fully exist, they are to some extent thought-
dependent as they actually subsist in accordance with someone’s
thought (cf. S. E. M 8. 11–12 ‘the signification is the actual state of
affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it
subsists in accordance with our thought’). More specifically, the
statement that one thing is distinguishable from another ‘according
13
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to the subsistence’ indicates that they are distinct following
processes of mental abstraction. Yet if two things ‘according to the
subsistence’ differ ‘only in thought’, then they are corporeally
identical but this same thing bear two distinct propositional
contents.27
To summarize, as Posidonius claims that substance differs
from matter according to these specific circumstances (κατὰ τὴν
ὑπόστασιν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον) he means that the same body have two
distinct lekta; that is, any corporeal body could be intellectually
represented as the active (οὐσία) and the passive (ὕλη) principles.
The definition of matter is explicit in the previous sentences: ‘it
has no determinate shape or quality of its own yet it is always in
some shape and quality’.28 Logically, as one expects, the
intellectually graspable content of the other principle should be
contrasting. In other words, substance is not in constant flux
without no determinate shape or quality of its own;29 substance
maintains its own determinate shape and quality. 
The Posidonian distinction between a stable ousia and an
unstable hule is meaningful because of the two eternally alternating
phases of conflagration and ordering in the Stoic universe. As
scholars pointed out, substance stands for ‘first or prime matter’
(cf. D. L. 7. 150): the pre-cosmic substance representing the
principles at the very moment of total conflagration.30 ‘Matter’, its
counterpart, stands for any particular body (including the cosmos)
as we find them during the diakósmesis; the matter that is
permeated with qualities and shapes as portrayed in the second
sentence (ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι ...).31 Likewise, besides this
diachronic perspective, the dichotomy also regards the universe
according to a synchronic viewpoint: that is, as it exists at one
point in time without reference to its history. So, the concept that
ousia differs from hule in thought implies that one can distinguish
the wholes’ underlying principles. Substance differs from matter
insofar as the conception of any particular body (including the
cosmos) mirrors the godly rational framework underlying it.32
As mentioned, this interpretation of F 92 basically
reproduces the views of relevant scholarship of the last 20 years.
14
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Stephen White’s article seems especially insightful in the sense that
he observed the notional charge of ‘subsistence’ and ‘in thought
only’. It is noteworthy though that there are some loose ends in
this interpretation. For instance, it has not been noticed that, if
Posidonius really held these ideas, his concept of ‘matter’ turns up
to be heterodox in the sense that matter does not stand anymore
for a three-dimensional inert medium, an effectively qualityless
body. ‘Matter’ stands now for a relentlessly changing qualified
object (‘it is always in some shape and quality’). Further, the
notional charge of ‘subsistence’ and ‘in thought only’, as observed
by White, clearly supports the view that Posidonius held that the
principles were incorporeal. Such standpoint would again clash
with what we know about Stoic principles. As we shall see, these
difficulties are solved when we understand the whole conceptual
picture conveyed by the combination of Arius fr. 20 and 27.
3 THE INTERPRETATION
We can now return to Arius’ fr. 27. F 92 throws light on F
96 as ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ are apposite to ‘substance’ and the
‘qualified individual’. More specifically, the fit juxtaposition of F 92
with the second half of F 96 discloses the theoretical content of
the text, and lets us closer to the metaphysical aspect of
Posidonius’ concept of genesis. The correspondence starts as the
text conveys two members in the ‘peculiarly qualified individuals’:
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν φασι δύο εἶναι τά δεκτικά μόρια, τὸ μέν τι
κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν, τὸ δέ <τι> κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ.
τοῦτο γάρ, ὡς πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν
ἐπιδέχεσθαι·
... In peculiarly qualified individuals (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν), he
says that there are two receptive parts, in respect to the
subsistence of the being (κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν) and of
the qualified thing (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ). It is the latter, as we
have often kept saying, that admits of increase and
diminution…
15
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The term τό ποιὸς ἰδίως is not actually found in Plutarch’s
On Common Conceptions 1083a-1084a (= LS 28 A). Long and
Sedley supply it to section (28 A) 3 based on the similarity of
argument between Plutarch and the Anonymous Academic treatise
(Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3008 = LS 28 C) where the term also
occurs.33 In any case, ‘peculiarly qualified individuals’ as presented
in F 96 are those viewed as possessors of uniquely identifying
qualities, the standard examples being Dion and Theon. Now, the
meaning of their two receptive parts (fr. 27) is, as I said,
illuminated as we understood it as reiterating the dichotomy
between ‘substance’ and ‘matter’. Like in Arius fr. 20, Posidonius
again theorises about a single body (τό ποιὸς ἰδίως) bearing two
distinct cognizable contents; that is, the distinction regards the
aspectual ‘subsistence’ of both receptive parts (cf. Διαφέρειν ... κατὰ
τὴν ὑπόστασιν). The active principle ousia overtly returns as one of
the aspects (κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν). Correspondingly, the
opposite passive principle also returns: like ‘matter’ the so-called
‘qualified thing’ is something that remains yet it is in constant flux
(... τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι·). 
The final part of the excerpt unfolds the philosophical
theory that underlies the analysis of the body into two
complementary components. Again, the juxtaposition with F 92
clarifies the metaphysical notions of the Stoic Posidonius.
μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταὐτὸν τό τε ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν [ὃ] ἐξ ἧς ἔστι
τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μηδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ καὶ
μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ’ ἕτερα
τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μηδ’ ἐν μέρει
θεωρεῖσθαι.
This very peculiarly qualified thing is not the same as the
substance from which it is made. Nor on the other hand is it
different from it, but is all but the same, in that it is a part of
the substance and occupies the same place as it, whereas
whatever is called different from something must be
separated from it (κεχωρίσθαι) and not be thought of
(θεωρεῖσθαι) as even part of it.
The first thing to be noticed is the puzzling language: μὴ
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εἶναι δὲ ταὐτὸν ... μηδ’ ἕτερον. The paradox, which was implicit in
the difference between substance and matter (F 92), comes to the
surface here. As one reads, the paradoxical relationship between
the qualified individual and its substance follows the rapport of
part and whole. Scholars have remarked that this specific
discussion in Hellenistic circles ultimately derives from Plato’s
Parmenides (137 ff.).34 There is also a clear tendency in recent
scholarship35 to read τὴν οὐσίαν instead of τῆς οὐσίας; the latter had
been established by Bake's 1810 edition of Posidonius and
subsequently accepted by Diels and the majority of editors. The
variance between both readings is actually crucial. I analyse first
the problems with τὴν οὐσίαν before showing how the other
option elucidates the Posidonian tenet.
Despite the fact that reputable publications prefer τὴν
οὐσίαν to τῆς οὐσίας, this option, as far as I know, has never been
consistently argued for.36 The grammatical reading of τὴν οὐσίαν
sounds worse than of τῆς οὐσίας (‘because the substance is a
part ...’, but a part of what?). Besides, it seems unlikely that
Posidonius would hold that ousia, ‘the being of the thing’, is ‘part
of’ its counterpart which is in constant flux. One reads earlier that
‘the qualified things supervene on substance’ (τοὺς ποιοὺς
λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους.). Likewise, the
‘qualified thing’ is presented as being ‘made out of’ the ousia (... ἐξ
ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο). Specifically, such relationship of whole and part
between poios and ousia seems objectionable in the sense that,
within the pair, it is ousia that turns up as ontologically prior to
poios. According to Plato’s Parmenides, the urtext for the
discussion, ‘the part is contained in the whole’ (ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ
τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια; 144 E 9 and 145 B 8) and, within the pair above,
it is poios that is contained in ousia (... τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας). 
There is, indeed, another Stoic fragment where a related
paradox reintroduces the notion of part and whole. It is Philo’s
Aet. Mundi (48-51) that presents Chrysippus’ solution to another
puzzle about change and identity. Here the two individuals
somehow manage to be so differentiated that when Dion's foot is
amputated he becomes indistinguishable from Theon. At the
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second half of this excerpt, which is notoriously difficult to
interpret, Philo says (50): 'Let the world be the counterpart of
Dion, since it is complete, and the world's soul [i.e. the world after
the conflagration] the counterpart of Theon, incomplete, since the
part is less than the whole; and as Dion's foot was removed, so let
all the bodily part of the world be removed from it ...' Yet even
supposing, as Sedley does,37 that Philo indicates that Chrysippus
understands Dion to be related to Theon as whole to part, that is,
the cosmos would be the whole and its soul (i.e. cosmos after the
conflagration) the part, it seems clear that Philo understands this
relationship as another unwelcome consequence of Chrysippus’
solution.38 Philo emphasises that, following his answer to the
puzzle, Providence would be perishable (‘For any one, copying the
form of this argument and adapting it to the entire world, may
prove in the clearest manner that providence itself is liable to
corruption.’ 49) and imperfect (‘let the soul of the world take the
place of Theon, who was imperfect, since a part is less than the
whole’. 50). In fact, one could hardly infer from this passage that
ousia stands for a part of poios in Posidonius’ F 96 E – K. 
Conversely, the reading μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας is consistent
with the content of the relevant Stoic fragments. In order to
understand it, we should first realize that F 96 (also) concerns the
everlasting cycle of creation and destruction undergone by the
cosmos. This is the specific cosmological doctrine where the Stoics
admittedly theorize about two entities occupying the same
substance. That Posidonius followed the early Stoics concerning
this viewpoint one can learn from a report in Diogenes Laertius of
the Stoic distinction between different senses of the term ‘cosmos’:
They speak of cosmos in three ways: <in one> it is god
himself who is the peculiarly qualified individual consisting of
all substance (τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν), indestructible
and ingenerable, being the demiurge of the cosmic order and
consuming at set periods of time the whole substance in to
himself and reproducing it again from himself; they also say
that cosmos is the cosmic order itself (αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν)
of the cosmos; and thirdly it is what is composed out of both.
(138) Cosmos is the peculiarly qualified individual of the
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substance of the whole (ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας), or,
as Posidonius says in the Meteorology (the elementary
treatise) a systematic compound composed from heaven and
earth and the natural constitutions in them, or a systematic
compound composed from gods and men and what has come
into being for their sake. (D. L. 7. 137 – 138; D. L. 7. 138 = F
14 E – K)
§ 137 basically reiterates Chrysippus’ concept, as exposed
in Plutarch’ On Common Notions 1077 c—e (cf. n. 25) and also in
Philo above, that the soul of the cosmos survives the universal
conflagration as the elements of the world-order are transformed
back into fire.39 Accordingly, the first two definitions imply the
two entities (Zeus and Providence in Plutarch, the world’s body
and soul in Philo) which compose the same thing, the cosmos, as
the third sense confirms. Posidonius’ fragment witness him
following in the steps of his great predecessor. On the one hand,
the idea of a ‘peculiarly qualified individual of the substance of the
wholes’ (ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας) echoes the first sense
of cosmos in § 137 (τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν). This is god
himself, or the world’s soul, who survives the ekpyrosis. On the
other, ‘a systematic compound composed from heaven and earth
and the natural constitutions in them’ represents the cosmic order
(τὴν διακόσμησιν), the world’s body that is always in flux yet
perishes in the conflagration.40 Still, the passage further confirms
that he also conceived two entities occupying the same substance.
The world’s soul (... τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας ...) and body (... καὶ τῶν ἐν
τούτοις φύσεων) should stand respectively for ousia and poios: the
two receptive parts of the individual in F 96. 
As I said earlier, the idea that ousia and poios in F 96 stand
respectively for whole and part sounds more consistent than the
other option. Stoic physics teaches that the cosmos expands to its
maximum size in the periodic conflagration; that is, when ousia is
instantiated. There is also evidence witnessing that the fiery
element, or god, holds the whole substance in the ekpyrosis
whereas it only occupies part of it during the world-order.41 Again,
the clearly objectionable idea is the one found in Philo’s De Aet.
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Mundi 50 where the post-conflagration ‘worldsoul’ is part of the of
cosmic world.42 It is not clear whether Chrysippus really argued
that the ‘worldsoul’ stands for the cosmos as part to whole: it
could be another unwelcome consequence of Chrysippus’ point
about Zeus and Providence. In any case, given Philo’s account, it is
very unlikely that Chrysippus stated the opposite; it is very unlikely
that he affirmed that the soul of the world is a whole and the
cosmos its part. Now, one could speculate what allowed
Posidonius to claim that the world during cosmic conflagration is a
whole. There is a subtle yet effective difference in his particular
cosmology propitiating this concept. I go (briefly) through this
cosmological standpoint before analysing the dynamics of body
and soul in Posidonius’ ontology.
So, one should bear in mind that Chrysippus’ conceptual
framework involving the cosmic mass and its surrounding infinite
void was problematic. The obvious difficulties facing this
cosmological model turn up in Plutarch’s On stoic self-
contradictions 1054b–1055a where the Academic criticizes
Chrysippus for stating that the cosmos was indestructible because
its parts tend to the middle, in spite of theorizing at the same time
about an extra-cosmic void which was deprived of absolute
directions such as up, down and middle.43 Still, further problems
can be detected in Chrysippus’ definitional statement in Arius
Dydimus’ Epitome f. 25 Diels about the compound stemming
from the co-presence of occupied place and void: ‘If what can be
occupied by an existent is partly occupied and partly unoccupied,
the (resulting) whole will be neither void nor place, (τὸ ὅλον 〈 οὔτε〉
κενὸν ἔσεσθαι οὔτε τόπον) but another nameless thing (ἕτερον δέ τι
οὐκ ὠνομασμένον)’. Specifically, the uncertainty about the status of
this nameless whole (τὸ ὅλον) sounds as a theoretical liability when
we remind that other Stoic sources categorically reject the idea that
such compound could be considered a whole. Whole is predicated
of what is ordered; the cosmos (expanded or not), for instance.
The compound of cosmos (i.e. occupied place) and its surrounding
limitless void should be distinguished from it; it is called to Pan,
the All.44
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Yet, there is evidence that Posidonius attempted to reorient
Stoic physics in view of the very problems the Chrysippean
conceptual framework was facing. He advanced the novel claim
that the extra-cosmic void is not infinite or unlimited, as the early
Stoics preached; rather, the void is precisely the size occupied by
the cosmos when it expands in its periodic conflagration.45 I have
dealt with the bearing of this doxa within Stoic cosmology
somewhere else.46 Here it suffices to point out that Posidonius’
concept rendered the Stoic theory of void in line with that of
‘place’ (‘what is entirely occupied by being, or what can be
occupied by being’ Arius’ Epitome f. 25 Diels). Simultaneously, it
solves the difficulty apparent in Chrysippus’ formulation above (τὸ
ὅλον ... ἕτερον δέ τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον) by turning the conflagrated
cosmic mass into a definite ‘whole’. In Posidonius’ ekpyrosis there
is absolutely nothing apart from the cosmos; not even void. 
Correspondingly, Posidonius’ doxa about the void (F
84/97a E−K) most probably purported to review the very nature
of the cosmos during the periodic conflagrations. Further clues of
his original intention can be gathered from the fact that the
doctrine of ekpyrosis was being questioned, if not abandoned, by
leading figures of the Stoa such as Panaetius (cf. Philo, Aet. Mund.
78). As Tieleman has recently observed,47 ‘the idea of the cosmic
body as stretching out infinitely or at least very far is problematic
from a Stoic point of view. Even if in such a stage the unicity of
the divine cosmos is maintained, this does not hold good, at least
not in a credible way, for its characteristic of being coherent and
organic – an idea integral to its divine perfection.’ In other words,
t h e ekpyrosis was susceptible to doubt because the idea of a
loosely diffused cosmic mass within a disordered limitless void, i.e.
to Pan (Comm. not. 1074 b–c), seemed to run counter the Stoic
dogma of divine providence; particularly, when one reminds that
the life of the cosmos (of God) reaches its peak of perfection at
this moment. Conversely, Posidonius’ doxa (F 84/97a E−K)
reaffirms the orthodox conflagration of Chrysippus48 yet it has the
advantage of turning the resulting fiery substance into something
more akin to an organic unity.49 More to the point, it redefines the
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universe at the moment of the ekpyrosis as a perfect ‘whole’.
I think I have collected enough evidence to prove that the
two receptive parts of F 96, the (peculiarly) qualified thing and
substance, can be read as the everlasting cycle of world-order and
total conflagration in the life-history of the universe. It should be
also clear that the first entity (poios) is a part of the second one
(ousia). It remains to confirm that Posidonius’ ontology, as
conveyed in Arius f. 27, preaches that every animal in the world
can be analysed according to the dichotomy body (i.e. poios) and
soul (i.e. ousia). In this connection, I would like to draw attention
to a relevant Stoic fragment that equally introduces soul as
substance. Long and Sedley rightly collect it under the label ‘the
first and second genera’ (LS 28 F) yet do not mention the passage
in the comments (1987, 172-176). It is quite understandable. The
content of the fragment openly diverges from the Chrysippean
categories as portrayed in the same section.
But the philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno and
all who consider the soul to be body, collect its powers as
qualities in the substrate (έν τω ύποκειμένῳ ποιότητας). They
posit soul as substance already underlying (ώς ούσίαν
προυποκειμένην) the powers, and out of these two dissimilar
components they bring together a composite nature.
Iamblichus On the soul (Stobaeus 1. 367 17-22; SVF 2. 826)
A thoughtful analysis shows that this excerpt corroborates
my interpretation of F 96 above as it reproduces its main concepts.
One reads that the philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno
– that is, a Stoic such as Posidonius – theorize about a composite
nature made out of two entities: soul and the powers that consist
of qualities in the substrate (έν τω ύποκειμένῳ ποιότητας). Further,
there is a clear relationship of ontological primacy between both
parts. The substantial soul underlies the qualities (cf. τὴν οὐσίαν [ὃ]
ἐξ ἧς ἔστι ... Arius f. 27).
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4 CONCLUSION
We can now make a first attempt to read the whole
fragment (Arius f. 27 = F 96 E – K) taking into consideration the
fruits of our research about its metaphysical charge. The result of
the research is the following. Posidonius reoriented Stoic ontology
by rejecting the two orthodox Chrysippean genera, the material
substrate (οὐσία) and peculiarly qualified thing (ἰδίως ποιὸς or
ποιότης). He subsumes both genera under the heading ‘substance’
which now applies to the predominant qualities that define an
entity during all the times at which it exists (cf. F 92 E – K). We
have also seen that substance is analogous to soul in the case of
animated beings. On the other hand, Posidonius classifies as
‘qualities’ (ποιόν) the remaining, or non-essential, material features
of the body. Substance underlies such qualities which are said to be
liable to suffer alteration. 
Such metaphysical approach can be easily observed (and
confirmed). τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ
πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: Again, substance is
not either in flux or in constant generation and destruction (as
described in Plutarch). Substance only admits alteration, or genesis,
following the ἀλλοίωσςις -change. ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν οἷον
Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι διὸ καὶ
παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα [τὰ] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς
ἀναιρέσεως. My translation: ‘So, increase and diminution occurs in
qualified individuals, like Dion and Theon, therefore the
predominant quality of each thing persists from generation to
destruction’. I understand this sentence as an answer to the
Growing Paradox. Idios poios does not necessarily mean an
ontological status like poios few lines below. It signifies a given
organic body, like animals and plants, which is subject to
generation and destruction. Posidonius’ concept of substance
addresses the paradox in the sense that substance confers identity
to the organic bodies. Dion and Theon might increase or shrink
yet Dion and Theon crucially remain because ‘the [substantial]
predominant quality persists’. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν φασι δύο εἶναι
τά δεκτικά μόρια ... ἐπιδέχεσθα. I have already analysed this passage
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above. It clearly reiterates the ontological dichotomy of Arius f. 20
(= F 92 E – K). Contrasting to substance, the receptive member
poia admits constant alteration. μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταὐτὸν τό τε ποιὸν ἰδίως
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ... θεωρεῖσθαι. Again, poios idios means any given
organic body – that is, a body as one finds them in the world.
Accordingly, Posidonius’ doxa preaches that this changeable body
is made out of an underlying persistent substance and represents a
part of this substance.
This partial interpretation of the metaphysical charge of
Posidonius’ doxa about genesis (F 96 E – K = Arius f. 27) should
work as the conclusion for the present article. As promised above
(cf. n11), I intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of the
fragment in a forthcoming article. The notions still to be clarified
are the complementary physical aspect of genesis and the
reorientation of Posidonius’ Stoicism following his critical
engagement with other Hellenistic philosophical schools.
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RESUMO
O artigo analisa a teoria metafísica proposta em dois fragmentos
de Possidônio preservados na doxografia de Ário Dídimo, f. 20 e
f. 27 Diels (= F 92 and F 96 E – K). A pesquisa chega aos
seguintes resultados. Possidônio reorientou a ontologia estoica ao
abandonar as chamadas ‘categorias’ do estoicismo de Crisipo, o
substrato material (οὐσία) e o indivíduo peculiarmente qualificado
(ἰδίως ποιὸς ou ποιότης). Ele inclui os dois gêneros ortodoxos em
uma nova categoria ‘substância’ que agora identifica as qualidades
essenciais que definem um corpo durante todo tempo em que
existe, e classifica como ‘qualidades’ (ποιόν) ou ‘materia’ (ὕλη) as
características materiais não essenciais do corpo. A análise do
fragmento sobre Geração e corrupção (F 96 E – K) combinado a
outros fragmentos pertinentes (F 14 e F 84/97a E−K) tambem
revela que substância significa alma quando animais estão em foco.
A ‘alma substancial’ e subjacente às qualidades do corpo que são
passíveis de sofrer alterações. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Metafísica estoica; Possidônio; geração e corrupção; cosmogonia. 
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Aet. Mund. 78 ff) which is attributed to Boethus. Yet the referred doxa does not
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